Abstract. Secure two-party computation enables applications in which participants compute the output of a function that depends on their private inputs, without revealing those inputs or relying on any trusted third party. In this paper, we show the potential of building privacy-preserving applications using garbled circuits, a generic technique that until recently was believed to be too inefficient to scale to realistic problems. We present a Java-based framework that uses pipelining and circuit-level optimizations to build efficient and scalable privacy-preserving applications. Although the standard garbled circuit protocol assumes a very week, honest-but-curious adversary, techniques are available for converting such protocols to resist stronger adversaries, including fully malicious adversaries. We summarize approaches to producing malicious-resistant secure computations that reduce the costs of transforming a protocol to be secure against stronger adversaries. In addition, we summarize results on ensuring fairness, the property that either both parties receive the result or neither party does. Several open problems remain, but as theory and pragmatism advance, secure computation is approaching the point where it offers practical solutions for a wide variety of important problems.
Introduction
Data gains value when it can be used in computations with data from other sources. For example, my genetic information becomes much more valuable when I can use it in a computation to measure kinship with another individual's genetic data, contribute it to a scientific genome association study, or use it to analyze drug effectiveness by comparing it to the genomes of participants in a pharmaceutical study. All of those uses, however, seem to require exposing my private data to other parties (or the other parties being willing to provide their private data to me). This leaves individuals with a dilemma: either maintain privacy, but lose much of the potential value of their data; or give up on privacy and expose ones data to malicious uses.
Secure computation provides an attractive alternative. It enables data owners to keep their data private, while allowing it to be used in computations. Secure two-party computation allows two parties to cooperatively compute the output of a function, f (a, b), without revealing any information about their private inputs, a and b respectively (other than what can be inferred from the function output). The idea of secure function evaluation was introduced by Andrew Yao in the 1980s [52, 53] , but it has only recently become realistic to imagine large-scale, important problems being solved by practical secure computations. Realizing such secure computations would enable many real world applications. For example, government agencies could use it to implement biometric security checks [29] (e.g., the no-fly list) and video criminal identification using street cameras [28, 47] , without compromising the privacy of innocent citizens. If secure computation protocols can be inexpensive enough to execute on mobile devices, it could also enable applications using smartphones such as proximity-based voting, common interest and contacts matching, and real-time marketing [27] .
In this paper, we focus on a generic approach to secure two-party computation known as garbled circuits or Yao circuits [52] . A garbled circuit protocol allows two semihonest parties, a circuit generator and a circuit evaluator, to compute an arbitrary function f (a, b) , where a and b are private inputs from each party, without leaking any information about their respective secret inputs beyond what is revealed by the function output itself. We provide background on the garbled circuit protocol in Section 2. Although garbled circuit protocols have a reputation for being inefficient and requiring excessive amounts of memory, there are ways to implement garbled circuit protocols that take advantage of pipelining and circuit-level optimizations to enable much faster execution. Section 3 describes our framework for efficient garbled circuit protocols and reports on results using it for several applications.
An important parameter of any secure computation protocol is the threat model. The weakest commonly used threat model is the semi-honest threat model, where both parties are assumed to follow the protocol as specified but attempt to learn additional information about the other party's private inputs from the protocol transcript. This is the easiest model in which to build scalable applications, and the model most frequently used by implemented systems [9, 26, 32, 37, 47, 51] ). Although this model may be appropriate for some realistic situations in which both parties have limited ability to interfere with the execution or a vested interest in the correctness of the results, it assumes a very weak adversary so is insufficient for many important use scenarios.
The strongest model is called malicious adversary model, where an attacker can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol specification to pry on other parties privacy. Several techniques have been proposed for converting a protocol that is secure under the semihonest model into a protocol that is secure against a malicious adversary, which we discuss in Section 4, along with our work on making these conversions less expensive.
A second important facet of secure computation is fairness, which requires the participating parties obtaining the results of the computation simultaneously. Although fairness seems impossible to achieve since one party could just abort the protocol after obtaining the result, surprisingly, it turns out that fairness is achievable for some functions, and that for other functions a relaxed definition of partial fairness may be useful. We discuss our results on ensuring fairness in Section 5.
Garbled Circuits Background
Garbled circuits were introduced by Yao [53] as a generic mechanism for secure computation. A standard garbled circuit protocol involves two parties who wish to cooperatively compute the output of a function that depends on private data from both parties without revealing that private data. One party is known as the generator, who produces a garbled circuit for computing the function. The other party, the evaluator, evaluates
